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ABSTRACT
The Selective Capacity of the Likely to Become a Public Charge
Clause in the Visa Issuance Process
by Camila Morsch
This paper provides an empirical examination of how the Likely to Become a Public Charge
Clause (LPCC) is used in the American visa issuance process. This work covers literature on the
logic and usage of the LPCC since the late 1800’s to present, suggesting administrative use of
the LPCC expands according to different circumstances beyond its intended purposes. The
quantitative portion of this work evaluates the use of the LPCC (for both immigrant applicant
and nonimmigrant applicant populations) from 1966 to 2002 to ascertain the effect of economic
and security conditions on the use of the LPCC. Applied Statistical Logistic Transformation and
Regression techniques support the hypothesized relationship between the use of the LPCC and
the terrorism-related variable for the non-immigrant applicant population at the 0.03 level of
significance. Descriptive time-series techniques indicate co-variance between the use of the
LPCC and unemployment rate for the immigrant applicant sample.
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INTRODUCTION
The celebration of the immigration tradition in the United States is not shared by all in
American society. Policy makers, administrators, economic interest groups, scholars and the
general public differ on opinions related to the dilemma of whether the U.S. should honor its
origins of open doors or have a more selective immigration policy. For any of these arguments
the visa issuance process is critical, and so are the restrictions that apply to applicants seeking
entrance to the United States for permanent or temporary reasons. Many who advocate a more
selective immigration policy and, equally, many who fight for a more open and egalitarian
immigration system do not realize that since 1822 the “Likely to Become a Public Charge”
clause (LPCC) has survived historical and legal changes to become the most used ground of
ineligibility (or, restriction clause) to deny an American visa (Edwards 2001, 4).
If use of the LPCC is considerably larger than any other subjectively restrictive clause, then
what factors stimulate an expansion in the use of the LPCC? Has this open legal provision been
used more frequently in years of major socio-economic difficulties and in critical border-security
challenges caused by terrorist attacks against the U.S.? Has the LPCC functioned as a loophole
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to adapt the selection of aliens receiving visas
according to the demands that the country faces in specific periods? Is this restrictive role of the
LPCC a tradition of the American visa issuance policy, or is it more a result of repeated
adjustment practices?
The power of the Public Charge Doctrine to restrictively select immigrant (permanent
residents) and nonimmigrant visa applicants (temporary visa holders) has rarely been studied.
Most of the information on the Likely to Become a Public Charge (LPC) doctrine is provided by
government reports and general historical investigations of immigration practices (Daniels 2004;
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Tichenor 2002.) Following the guidelines of the Clinton administration on the interpretation of
the LPC clause, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 1 proposed that the LPC
doctrine be classified into two different types (INS 1999). The first focuses on the use of the
public charge clause after an immigrant is already in the United States (i.e. grounds for removal)
and the second type, here named pre-entry, which is the main theme of this study, refers to using
the LPCC to deny entrance to aliens seeking American permanent residence or temporary visas.
The decision to concentrate on the pre-entry use of the LPCC, for this study, relies on the
following three reasons. First, the number of people considered inadmissible by the American
Consulate services abroad on the grounds of the LPCC pre-entry each year is much higher than
the number of aliens removed on the grounds of the LPCC since 1980 (Department of Homeland
Security 2003). Second, recent research has paid much more attention to the post-entry type of
LPCC and has, consequently, undervalued the LPC clause’s restrictive power and role in the
current American immigration policy and practices. Third, the possibility to determine the LPC
clause’s use during different periods of social, economic, and security-related circumstances
suggests that American immigration practices for visa issuance are variably selective.
This study begins with a historical overview of the immigration system, specifically of the
usage of the LPCC since its recognition by federal legislation in 1822. In addition to the
historical review, I also provide an analysis of data on the utilization of the LPCC from 1966 to
2002. The tests will determine whether correlations exist between the use of the LPCC and
economic downturns, the arrival of the 1996 welfare reform, major terrorist attacks against the
U.S., LPCC regulatory and legislative changes, and the total number of visas issued abroad for
each population (immigrant applicants and nonimmigrant applicants.) Finally, the results on the
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Today United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS),
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utilization of the LPCC are used to discuss possible quantitative and qualitative tendencies
within the processes of visa issuance and selection of immigrants.
The results of the analysis substantiate the hypothesized relationship between the use of the
LPCC and the security-related variable at the 0.03 level of significance, in regards to the nonimmigrant population. In what concerns the immigrant population, descriptive time-series
analysis indicates that the variable time plays a major whole between the use of the LPC clause,
and unemployment rate, and legislative-regulatory changes. While the former results are easily
visualized, the analysis of the immigrant-population data requires a more detailed investigation
of how unemployment rate and legislation changes have influenced the use of the LPCC over the
years.
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW
The United States is a traditional immigrant state (i.e. a state that has a specific immigration
policy instead of treating immigration as part of its foreign policy.) Since its foundation many
people have dreamed about coming to the U.S. to be part of the American dream. Many people
have had their applications denied. Whether or not the American immigration laws conform to a
system that honors the label of a country with “safe borders and open doors” is yet to be verified.
One of the major reasons for questioning how open America is for newcomers is the significant
use of the LPC clause to deny visas for immigrant and non-immigrant 2 applicants since its
recognition by federal law, in 1822 (Edwards 2001, 6). The LPCC is one of the most (if not the
most) important and traditional mechanisms of visa constraint within the American immigration
selection process. 3
Although it is easy to find scholarship and historical investigations on American immigration
policy, material specifically related to the LPC doctrine is scarce. However, when cited, the
LPCC is frequently referred to as an instrument to “preserve the flow of qualified, capable
immigrants. It is a tool for keeping out or expelling unproductive immigrants…” (Edwards 2001,
1)
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According to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, immigrants are all aliens who come to the United States to
reside permanently (lawful permanent residents, commonly known as “green card” holders). Non-immigrants are all aliens
who enter the country for temporary and specific purposes (included under this category are foreign students, fiancés of
U.S. citizens, and temporary workers. Asylees and refugees are treated differently, neither being considered immigrants
nor nonimmigrants upon entry.) However, non-immigrants are becoming immigrants without leaving the country more
frequently compared to twenty years ago. According to data provided by the Congressional Research Service, Report for
Congress, in October 2004, there are more aliens acquiring permanent residence status through adjustment (procedure
followed by aliens who are already in America as nonimmigrants or under humanitarian grounds to ask for their
adjustment of status and become an immigrant without having to leave the country) than through a petition to an American
consulate abroad (Wasem 2004, 6). Immigrants and nonimmigrants are subject to the LPC clause test. And given the fact
that nonimmigrants have the possibility to become green card holders, the effect of the LPC test on the admission of
temporary visa holders is connected to the effect of the LPC clause on the selection of future American permanent
residents.
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The Report of the Visa Office (1966-2002) brings all grounds for ineligibilities listed and divided by category,
immigrant and non-immigrant. Among the subjective categories, the LPC clause is the most used clause to deny
visas in both categories, in every year studied.
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The LPC concept was first used in 1645 by the colony of Massachusetts and was recognized
by federal law in 1822 (Edwards 2001, 2). The LPCC started to be adopted by the states at the
end of the 17th century “to prevent the poor and the impotent from being imported.” When the
Union took over the subject, the Federal law included the LPC clause with the text that excluded
any immigrant “unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public
charge. 4 ”(Edwards 2001, 3)
In 1888, Richmond Mayo Smith wrote about the concerns over the large numbers of
immigrants entering America. He explained that after the American Revolution “These [the
immigrants], of course, were the most desirable members of their communities; and the
wonderful progress of the United States has been due partly to the character of these newcomers” (Smith 1888, 61). As the profiles and the origin of immigrants changed over the years,
Smith suggests that there is a constant necessity of congressional action to control immigrant
flows. Although the American immigration policy has rarely set tight qualification requirements
or low ceiling numbers for immigrants and nonimmigrants (except for the periods of Asian
exclusionism,) administrative regulations have ensured the adoption of more stringent
immigration control initiatives in difficult, especially economically harsh, periods (Morris 1985,
8). One of the best examples of the executive branch’s manipulative ability to administer
immigration control is the discretionary power granted by law and regulations to immigration
officers through the LPCC .
One century ago, Smith (1888) was already worried about the great amount of discretionary
power given to immigration officials. In the case of LPCC utilization, the old preoccupation
remains valid. The LPC test may apply not only to those who might, at any time, become
4

Since 1965, the text of the law permits deportation and requires visa rejection of “any alien likely at any time
to become a public charge.” (Immigration Act 1990, Section 212 (a) 4)
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financially dependent upon the federal government but to those, who, in the opinion of the
consular officer may weaken or harm society, not only economically, but socially and culturally
(INS 1999, 3). In 1888, the discussion was whether waves of immigration, similar to the 1850’s,
should continue (Daniels 2004, 11). If not, then, consular officers should find a mechanism to cut
immigration numbers and elevate immigrants’ qualifications. According to Smith (1888), the
cultural and economic changes caused by the foreign-born population were as positive as the
arrival of the railroads to the development of the United States as a potential world superpower.
However, the circumstances brought by a pre-industrial society, which had already marched
towards the American West, and which had already sufficed its needs for unskilled labor,
required the use of the LPCC to balance immigrant numbers.
The issue of immigration reduction is very contradictory. Smith (1888), who favored
immigration, at the same time agreed on the necessity to restrictively select immigrants. Smith
(1888) was also concerned with the implications that this restrictionist posture would cause in
terms of international relations. This same conflict persists at the center of the immigration
debate today. How can the U.S. decrease the number of admitted aliens and increase the
qualifications of immigrants and nonimmigrants without losing the libertarian features of the
origins of the American immigration law? How do these limitations interact with the American
foreign affairs? Once more, the LPCC becomes one convenient legal provision to apply
qualitative restrictions through administrative regulations and guidelines. Not only have
exclusionary clauses been used to restrict immigrants during economic crises, but also during
periods of explicit racial discrimination and excessive immigration flows (Tichenor 2004, 179).
Although the LPCC is a potential instrument of immigration restriction, it is not in itself a
cause for such practice. The varying usage of the LPCC is linked to major social, cultural and
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economic factors, which have influenced the American immigration laws and practices,
constantly or intermittently, during specific historical events or periods.
According to Daniels (2004, 19) race was the major factor that contributed to the American
immigration policy to provoke a swing toward a closed position. Historical literature explains
that, at many times, legislators and public administrators advocated in favor of a policy that
would not be color-blind, or even neutral to other factors (Morris 1985, 20). Characteristics on
morals and beyond were taken under consideration in the selection of immigrants. Benjamin
Franklin, known for his salient American nativism (Daniels 2004, 8), advocated that immigrants
who were not Caucasian (white) and who did not know how to speak English should not be
welcomed in the American “Melting Pot.”
In 1875 the first legal recognition of race bias within the U.S. immigration policies came
with the Chinese Exclusion Act (The Library of Congress, para.1). Not only was the U.S. more
concerned about the quality of its potential immigrants, but also about preserving an occidental
and liberal culture within the American borders. With the Asian exclusion laws in effect from
1875 to 1943, the Chinese community suffered a great loss in numbers, and because of this, there
was little possibility to form Chinese families and strong communities during the period of legal
exclusion (Lee 2003). Chinese women (and Asian women in general) suffered more with the
period of restriction. First, the legal provision that had the goal of preventing the entrance of
women for prostitution was interpreted very broadly. Second, many of the Asian women who
traveled to American ports to reunify with their Asian families were denied entrance. In
addition, Asian women were not strong or bold enough to take the chance to cross the Mexican
borders illegally (Daniels 2004).
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According to Lee (2003), many Chinese immigrants came into America illegally during the
exclusionary period. The vast majority of these immigrants were men. On the other hand, a good
number of aliens denied entrance at a port of entry during the 1920’s and 1930’s were Asian
women (Lee 2003). The indication here, then, is that the LPCC might have been used at the port
of entries to highlight the gender factor into an already racist policy. Besides, in this case, the
LPCC functioned contrary to the principle of family reunification, which has always been
considered one of the most important pillars of the American immigration policy (Daniels 2004,
8). The extreme precautions of the beginning of the twenty century, might be also related to the
U.S. effort to prevent foreign anarchists from entering the country (anti-anarchist periods date
from 1900-1914.) Therefore, during the first decades of the 1900’s, when the LPCC was heavily
used, we have historical indications of both security and racial concerns.
Despite the fact that racial bias was explicitly included in the exclusionary periods
(1875-1943), and that the fear of the spread of anarchism from other countries contributed to
difficult immigrant assimilation in America, economic factors contributed to a wider use of the
LPCC. The numbers that show how immigration officers used the LPCC to avoid labor
competition during the Great Depression are overwhelming. The administrative power used to
guide the officers to adopt the LPCC incorporated the desperation and the emergency peculiar to
the historical economic crash of 1929. Through the analyses of three sequential presidential
statements, it is possible to infer how the rates of immigration and unemployment were
manipulated by the usage of the LPCC during the 1930’s. In the first presidential speech about
the necessity to restrict immigration, Hoover (Federal Register Division 1956a) explicates that
the recession is such that the country cannot wait on Congress to take action to decrease
immigration numbers.
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According to President Hoover, “the administration made recommendations to Congress in
the last session as to restriction that might be made and, while the committees were favorable, no
action was taken. This will at least carry over until Congress can consider the question” (Federal
Register Division 1956a, para.4). In addition, in his opinion, the country may use the LPCC as
an instrument to tighten up the volume of immigration. He explained that…

“.. practically all countries suffering from unemployment have tightened their immigration
restrictions in the past few months—Canada and most of the European countries. There
seems to be a general realization that each country should take care of its own problem and,
while there is no denial of immigration at large, it is merely a tightening against persons
likely to fall in the class of public charges.” (Federal Register Division 1956a, para.7,
emphasis in the original)

On the same day, the White House released the report of the Department of State, which had
inspired president Hoover to advise immigration officers to use the LPCC to restrict
immigration. The report clearly explained the new circumstances in which an applicant could be
denied on the basis of the LPC rule:

“In normal times an applicant for admission to the country (not otherwise ineligible) if he
appears to be an able-bodied person who means to work and has sufficient funds to support
himself and those dependent on him until he gets to his destination in that part of the United
States where he is going, would be admitted without particular stress being placed on
whether he has other means of support. But in abnormal times, such as the present, where
there is not any reasonable prospect of prompt employment for an alien laborer or artisan
who comes hoping to get a job and to live by it, the particular consular officer in the field to
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whom application for a visa is made (upon whom the responsibility for examination of the
applicant rests), will before issuing a visa have to pass judgment with particular care on
whether the applicant may become a public charge, and if the applicant cannot convince the
officer that it is not probable, the visa will be refused.” (Federal Register Division 1956a,
para.4, emphasis in the original)

Two Presidential conferences (113 White House Statement on Government Policies to
Reduce Immigration of March 26, 1931 and 189 The President's News Conference of May 15,
1931) demonstrated that the administrative recommendation to use the Public Charge clause to
restrict the entrance of foreign labor had reversed immigration numbers drastically. In the
months of February, March and April of 1931, the wider use of the LPC clause reversed
immigration numbers from about 12,000 monthly to a net departure of about 3,500 (Federal
Register Division 1956b, para.9). In the same vein, the numbers for the April/1930 to
March/1931 are also very significant, as demonstrated by Table 1.
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Table 1. Monthly Report on Immigrants Admitted/Departed or Deported (1930-1931)
Immigrant aliens
Emigrant aliens
Month

Year

Admitted

April

1930

22,261

6,620

May

1930

19,414

6,089

June

1930

14,944

6,095

July

1930

13,323

7,047

August

1930

14,816

7,300

September 1930

17,792

7,702

October

1930

13,942

8,021

November 1930

9,209

7,178

December 1930

6,439

7,691

January

1931

4,091

6,921

February

1931

3,147

6,985

March

1931

3,577

7,562

142,955

85,211

Total

Departed and Deported

Source: Federal Register Division. National Archives and Records Service. Public Papers of the United States,
Herbert Hoover, 1931, p.257, 1956b.

As one can see, the use of the LPCCs to deny admission has been significant since the very
early periods of the nation to either bar the creation of strong foreign-born communities in
America or to protect labor. One question that arises is whether the current use of the LPCC still
follows these same principles. Once the Civil Rights movement changed America, how did the
immigration policy and practices respond?
With Lyndon B. Johnson in power a lot of the desires of the founding fathers, who “took as a
given that continued immigration was vital for the health of the nation,” (Daniels 2004, 6) gained
life. From the 1970’s till 1986 (year the Immigration Reform and Control Act, IRCA, was
passed) the country watched the numbers of newcomers skyrocket as a result of the legislation
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enacted right after the Civil Rights era. At that time the American Golden Doors were perceived
as more open “to receive not only the opulent and respectable stranger, but the oppressed and the
persecuted of all nations and religions, whom we shall welcome to participate in all of our rights
and privileges.” (George Washington, as cited in Daniels 2004, 7).
However, even during the golden years of relatively easy entrance the principles of
restrictionism were revisited; the origins of nativism were often cited as mechanisms of
resistance against the new libertarian perspective on immigration. While the ideas of George
Washington were adopted by the advocates of a more moderate policy, Benjamin Franklin (as
cited in Daniels 2004) was a legendary American father who was remembered by extreme
restrictionists. Franklin’s ideas concerning immigration control inspired the restrictionist
movements of the l980’s. According to Franklin:

Why should the Palatine door be suffered to swarm into our settlement and by herding
together establish their language and manners to the exclusion of ours? Why should
Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of aliens who will shortly be so
numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them. (Daniels 2004, 8)

Despite the presence of very conservative lobbying in the twentieth century, more liberal and
egalitarian perspectives on immigration control were in fact institutionalized with the help of the
Civil Rights Movement. In 1965, new liberalizing provisions amended the American
immigration policy to increase legal immigration in order to contribute to the assimilation of
foreign-born families and communities that were already in the United States.
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Although the recognition of restrictionist viewpoints are denied by numbers of massive
immigration after Lyndon Johnson’s presidency 5 , the indexes on the usage of the LPCC during
the early 1970’s continued high for the population of immigrant applicants. With the difficult
economic periods of the late seventies and early eighties, the population started to complain
about the huge numbers and benefits granted to the foreign-born population. A new era of
restrictionism and some isolated ideas of exclusionism started to occur (Morris 1985, 25). During
the same period, international terrorism became a growing menace. How best to control
terrorism is a subject now discussed among international public and private entities. In 1978, the
United States and Western Europe were consolidated as preferred international targets in the
battle against secularism and modernization (CIA, 2005).
Perhaps because of the novelty of the terrorist argument, the literature on immigration
restriction clauses paid more attention to the economic reasons for immigration restraint, rather
than to security-related predictors. Calavita (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994, 64) believes
that since the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, immigration policies and
regulations have indeed been made to “respond both to the long-standing economic realities of
immigration and to the new restrictionism.” One of the greatest changes with the IRCA was the
implementation of sanctions to punish employers who would contract illegal immigrants.
Another innovation of IRCA was to create a “Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program,
[both of] which contributed to a further influx of immigrant workers into the U.S. labor market.”
(Calavita 1994, 65)
Differently from the 1990 Immigration Act, which changed the whole structure of
application and admission processes for legal immigrants, the 1986 IRCA focused more on
5

The numbers of massive admission during the 1960’s and 1970’s were mainly caused by an overwhelming number
of immigrant applicants who were preferentially admitted, like immediate relatives of American citizens and
American residents (Daniels 2004, 36)
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providing tools to assure border control and, at the same time, cheap labor. It is not a surprise
that the IRCA contributed to the failure of immigration law in its goal to reduce the problem of
border crossers in America. In addition, the changes made in 1986 and 1990 seem not to have
diminished the disagreements and questions that have surrounded the matter of legal immigration
and its frustrating outcomes either. Scholars and policy-makers believe that these laws are not
efficient to stop illegal immigration and to encourage the arrival of new immigrants who would
likely integrate better in American society (Cornelius et. al 2003, 13). The fact here is not an
issue of arrogance, neither of conservatism, but the discovery of what is best for the American
society.
When the subject is the desirable profile of immigrants, different ideas emerge.
Restrictionists, in the late 1980’s till the present, have repeated the idea that young adults should
have preference to get into the country due to the amount of tax payments that they generate
(Martin 1994, 135). On the other hand, some feel that young adults generate more taxes and, at
the same time, displace more Americans from their jobs (Martin 1994, 97). Most scholars
believe immigrants should be admitted to this country if they qualify for jobs, which have more
demand than people to cover open positions (Suro 1996). If scholarship differs in the matter of
personal attributes that should be taken under consideration to deny or admit an alien, consular
officers also significantly disagree.
Jasso (1988), through the analysis of a fictional sample of immigrant applications, judged by
twelve immigration officers, found that certain applicants’ attributes, such as the condition of
having immediate family already in the U.S. and the condition of having a job offer, are
unanimously taken under consideration when it comes to an alien admission. Although other
characteristics, such as race, were proven to be inconsistent, Jasso focused her work on family
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reunification and employment availability. Before the 1990 Immigration Act, which established
new legal preferences specially allowing employers to sponsor skilled employees to
preferentially immigrate to the U.S., Jasso demonstrated that having a citizen sibling in the
United States and having a job offer were characteristics that caused unanimous agreement
among the Immigration Commission officers to elevate one’s applicant level of desirability.
Coincidently or not, the two umbrella categories in effect today (since 1990) to establish
preferences for permanent resident status are exactly related to these two requirements.
Jasso’s findings (1988) also suggest that high educational levels and English proficiency
were considered favorable by most of the officers. Despite the fact that there is no institutional
recognition regarding levels of desirability in terms of age, gender, race, education and English
proficiency for permanent residents in the current immigration policy, an officer may use these
criteria to deliberate whether an applicant is eligible or not to enter the country. “Although
immigration law specifies the qualifications for admission, consular officers are ordinarily the
final arbiters of whether an individual meets these qualifications.” (Morris 1985, 96)
Immigration laws also specify grounds for refusal or ineligibility. In this section of the
legislation, health threats, security threats and the likelihood of becoming a public charge, among
other items, are considered as legitimate grounds to deny visas. 6 While all other grounds for
refusal or ineligibility are very well defined, the LPCC remains an open legal provision.
Considering the heavy numbers on the utilization of the LPCC to deny visas and the
administrative guidelines on how to apply the LPC doctrine,7 one can infer that consular officers
may make use of this legal provision to control flows of immigration qualitatively. If this is true,
6

Grounds for refusal or ineligibility are analyzed in the next chapter, which deals specifically with legislation and
regulations about or related to the LPC clause. The grounds of ineligibility established by the INA (1952) are listed in
Appendix 1.
7
Specific analysis of the LPC clause within legislation and administrative interpretations will be covered in the next
chapter.
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the LPCC becomes an “administrative back door” to control quality of immigration flows, while
institutionally the American front door is still open. As the same LPC test applies to
nonimmigrant visa candidates, who are the largest public to be considered to adjustment of status
(a procedure that includes the change from temporary to permanent status,) the nonimmigrant
visa issuance process becomes another important administrative device to restrictively select
who will become an American permanent resident.
The fact that the LPCC may be used more or less without congressional oversight interferes
with the function of restriction clauses within the visa issuance process in different
circumstances. As mentioned above, not only economic emergencies are relevant to the study of
the LPCC. Not long after the American population had felt the power of international terrorism
against the U.S. in the early 1990’s, another urgent concern was rising among the general public:
domestic terrorism and its immediate relationship with foreign-born communities. With few
legal documents linking immigration and terrorism in the 1990’s, immigration officers became
part of the system that legally declared war on terror in 2001. The 9/11 Commission (Wasem and
Garcia 2005, 3) described the consular officers as necessary “full partners in counterterrorism
efforts,” which changed the manner of examining immigrants’ and nonimmigrants’ applications
after September 11.
Scholars like Amir Etzioni (2004) defend the influence of certain anti-terrorism policies on
immigrants’ freedoms. The effect of September 11 on the admission of permanent residents to
the United States is not thoroughly studied to this point. However, the application procedures
have become stricter for certain applicants, according to guidelines of the Consular Affairs
Bureau. 8 In addition, the usage of restrictive tools such as the “Likely to Become a Public

8

The Visa Office website brings the newest reports on immigration tendency. Stricter rules and regulations for applicants
from terrorist-related countries made headline on the website during the month of August/2005.
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Charge” clause is cited by Tichenor (2002, 154) as tool to prevent dangerous people from
entering the country. If the LPCC may be used by immigration officers upon their discretion, one
can also say that terrorism and national-security challenges may encourage an officer to deny
entrance to aliens who may, in his or her opinion, become harmful to society, and who cannot be
denied on grounds of security issues. 9
After September 11 the population, stimulated by the media, instantly reacted against the
Arab community and the temporary visa-holders (immigration status of all September terrorist
hijackers upon entry); the discussion about the relationships between ethnicity and threat, and
threat and immigration were revisited. Shall America accept massive numbers of temporary
immigrants such as students and specialized workers, who have such different cultures and
beliefs? What kinds of people are safe for America? Without questioning the issues of racial
discrimination, qualitative immigration restrictions exist considering factors such as age,
educational levels and skills. Liberal countries like New Zealand 10 have clearly established
means of qualitative selection within their immigration laws.
In New Zealand, a student that successfully graduates from college and who proves to be
well assimilated in society (assimilation is established through the demonstration of good credit,
proof of participation in civic associations, letters of recommendations from friends and previous
employers, and bank statements) is encouraged to immigrate (Immigration New Zealand 2005).
The prospective immigrants are offered permanent residence status and most of the rights and
entitlements that a New Zealand citizen has. It seems that New Zealand has taken advantages of
a filtration system in order to promote diversity, contentment and assimilation. Contrary to the
9

Terrorism and Security as grounds for ineligibility, although expanded by the PATRIOT ACT (2001), are still very strict
and require proof of terrorism involvement or terrorism linkage to serve as motives for visa denial (GAO 2002)
10
The official immigration New Zealand website has defined “studying in New Zealand” as an alternative way to
permanently immigrate to New Zealand. (Immigration New Zealand, 2005)
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American system, this system offers temporary visa holders, who obtained educational and
training skills in the country, an automatic right to immigrate.
According to Ruiz (2003), based on the Spanish experience, the best decision is to select
immigrants upon their capacity to get involved and integrated to the foreign environment. Ruiz
also advocates that the process of integration of immigrants would be enhanced by their
nationality, as the indigenous population would receive and better accommodate people with
similar culture. Surprisingly, in Spain, Latinos were considered the most desirable race in the
opinion of Spaniards (Centro di Investigaciones Sociologicas 2001). Although the fact of
choosing on the grounds of nationality may not be totally negative, it is very difficult to separate
discrimination from any race-related criterion of selection. Scholars, including Ruiz (2003), have
found solid arguments not to advocate in favor of a discriminatory or nationalist environment,
but to establish a connection between nationality and a better process of adaptation, once the
immigrant has been accepted by the foreign land.
Solid arguments against racial discrimination and stereotypes seem even more fundamental
after September 11. Anti-terrorism policies contributed to the adoption of extreme immigration
measures by the American Consular Posts abroad (Papademetriou 2003, 52). Since the
Homeland Security Department took control of the former INS, (now, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services [USCIS]), U.S. immigration regulations and practices function on the
basis of strict security and surveillance measures against immigrants and, especially,
nonimmigrants who come from terrorist-related countries (Papademetriou 2003, 49). If the
LPCC is used more frequently after terrorist attacks, it can be labeled as one of the extreme
administrative actions taken in response to these dreadful events. Nevertheless, if the use of
urgent proceedings becomes part of ordinary practice, it may be a sign that new legislation is
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required. A comprehensive immigration reform seems to be needed to “clarify the murky areas
in current policies and practices and to provide new incentives for compliance, thereby easing
the administrative burden” (Morris 1985, 136). In addition, a strong and clear public policy is
fundamental to preserving consistency within the visa issuance process.
In times of wars and expenditures that were not forecasted (natural disasters, for example),
America tries to review its immigration policy in order to reach harmony between the policy and
practices, law and goals. Suro (1996) advocates that the first and only goal of policy makers, in
reducing the problems that surround the question of immigration, is to decrease the numbers of
immigrants admitted. “Beyond this, at least as far as immigration is concerned, not much
forward thinking went into deciding what the future should look like” (Suro 1996, 16). The
likelihood of a better future for all residents of this country seems to be connected to the revision
of the current immigration policy, not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality.
While this does not happen, the study of the LPC doctrine as a mechanism to deny the entrance
of individuals who are not productive, self-reliant and who will not positively contribute to
society may indicate a qualitative facet of the American visa issuance process rarely identified up
to this point.

19

CHAPTER 2: RESTRICTION CLAUSES, LEGAL AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
The Immigration and Nationality Act has undergone several amendments since its enactment
in 1952. This chapter deals with historical legislative and regulatory changes specifically related
to the LPC clause. The main legal documents studied in this section are the INA (1952) and its
recent major reform, the Immigration Act of 1990. This Act not only reformed the INA
preference system, but also revised the Grounds for Exclusion Section (Section 212), preserving
the LPC clause, but collapsing some of the other subsections, which are named today “grounds
for ineligibility.” The legislative and regulatory investigation provided in this chapter is the result
of the study of the American immigration legal restrictions and regulations provided by the
USCIS on-line database (USCIS 2003) and the on-line database of the Library of Congress (Law
Library of Congress 2005).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) is considered the main current
immigration law in the United States. It is included in the U.S. Code under Title 8, “Aliens and
Nationality.” When it was enacted, the 1952 INA fortified the American immigration process as
a system of quotas and preferences, expanded the classes of nonimmigrant visas, augmented and
systematized grounds for the exclusion and denial of visas, and inserted qualitative exclusions
within the law. On the other hand, INA also “made all races eligible for naturalization, thus
eliminating race as a bar to immigration.” Another advancement was the elimination of sexism
from the text of immigration laws (USCIS 2004).
First of all, when one analyzes the INA in more detail, it is necessary to clarify the issue of
racial bias. Although the statement of non-discrimination is very impressive in terms of the year
in which it occurred (1952), the non-discrimination rule is more suitable to the process of
naturalization than to the immigrant selection process. Naturalized Americans are the corollary
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of the immigration system, but they cannot be considered the core of immigration numbers.
Immigrants are considered by the legislation as any alien who ingresses in American territory to
permanently reside. There is an enormous difference between the legal status of an American
citizen and an American permanent resident. Although the goal of a color-blind naturalization
statute had been realized (Daniels 2004, 119), in 1952, the national origins quota system and the
general rules of the visa selection process are found still restrictive and surrounded by racial
tendencies.
In relation to immigrants of Asian ethnicity, for example, Daniels (2004, 119) explains that
the INA kept the rule, which “no matter where they [Asians] were born or had citizenship, had to
be charged to the quotas of the nation of their ancestry.” Asian quotas were minimum compared
to the generous quotas allotted to the Europeans. Therefore, generally speaking, it seems that the
American immigration policy originally had a preoccupation with keeping the process of
immigration selection a lot more restrictive than the naturalization process. Consequently, the
national origins quotas that were kept in the 1952 Act applied to the immigrant candidates,
naturalization candidates to-be. In any case, the liberalizing clause of naturalization for all is
extremely important, especially once the immigration legislation became more egalitarian in the
1960’s by the adoption of the general worldwide quota-system established by the 1965 HartCeller Act. In short, the Hart-Celler Act was a series of amendments to the INA, which
transferred the thrust of the Civil Rights Movement to the American immigration policy (USCIS
2003).
The issue of racial bias in the INA allows us to better understand the distinction between a
permanent resident applicant and a candidate for citizenship, and the applicability of the LPCC.
The LPC test does not apply to the process of naturalization (conferment of citizenship by any
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means other than birth), but it does apply to the granting of permanent or temporary immigrant
status (INS 2002, 132). The LPCC is one of the grounds for refusal included in the 1952 INA,
originally under Section 212 (a) (15). However, Section 212 of the INA also suffered
modifications in the early 1990’s: the section was now referred to as grounds for “ineligibility”
instead of grounds for “refusal”, and many categories within this section were collapsed. The
LPCC was placed under Section 212 (a) (4).
Before the enactment of the 1990 Immigration Act, institutional restrictions had already
been part of the American immigration policy for more than one century, accompanying the
evolution of immigration legislation from its origins to present. According to Tichenor (2002),
when the port states of the Northeast started to screen immigrants, the organization of a selective
system was still very fragile. Most of the work was delegated to volunteers, who intended to
provide assistance for the newcomers (Tichenor 2002, 49). However, once the nineteenth century
arrived “with a whole new scenario of party and electoral organization, [it] created opportunities
to the debate between the recognition of rights to white Europeans and the nativist ideals of
superiority and isolationism to rise” (Tichenor 2002, 49). Tichenor also explains that “when the
federal judiciary stripped states of the authority to screen immigrants in 1890’s, nativists hoped
for broad new restrictions on European immigration settling in the country” (Tichenor 2002, 49).
Nevertheless, the states kept with the practice of screening prospective immigrants and
relying on volunteers’ and officials’ discretionary powers to decide who might become a public
charge for America. At that point, the pillars of the American demographics were being built to
keep the European lineage and also a nation of healthy and strong workers. However, if the
LPCC was first used “to keep out persons physically and mentally unable to take care of
themselves, it eventually barred the able-bodied poor” (Daniels 2004, 28).
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The head taxes and the bonds required for each passenger who could likely become a public
charge were the first practical mechanisms used by the states to restrict immigration (Tichenor
2002, 58-59). The state’s justification to regulate entrance of certain immigrants was tied to the
premise that a state could take measures to fight “against the moral pestilents of [foreign]
paupers, vagabonds and possible convicts” (Tichenor 2002, 59). Tichenor explains the evolution
of immigration practices in relation to the LPC clause, as saying that...

“...the few modest immigration controls established by state legislation both authorized the
potential exclusion of individual immigrants deemed “undesirable” (such as criminals, the
diseased, unmarried pregnant women and disabled persons considered likely to become
public charges), and created a system of bonding and head taxes to support immigrant poor
relief and other services. Enforcement of these measures continued to be the task of
philanthropists and volunteers of state immigration borders. Their chief concerns were to
maintain an efficient reception process and to assist immigrants in need of temporary
support” (Tichenor 2002, 66).

Although the federal government eventually took jurisdiction over the immigration matter
and the bureaucratic system was empowered to screen immigrants at the ports of entry, the
concern about creating an environment favorable for all people willing to come to America was
no longer unanimous (Daniels 2004, 28). The numbers of European immigration in the first
decade of the twentieth century increased considerably, and so did the number of people who
were deported and denied because of the LPCC (Edwards 2001, 4). If the LPC clause started as a
legal provision to prevent “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of
23

himself or herself” from entering the U.S., over time the clause was broadened and its capacities
varied according to the preferences of immigration officials (Daniels 2004, 29).
The selection process of immigrants in the first decades of the nineteenth century was
troublesome and expensive for the states. The scrutiny that began with a desire to keep American
society racially pure and physically strong soon became a reason to eliminate those who could
threaten the progressive economy of the Industrial years and the security of America.
After the World War I, European countries and the United States created a visa system as a
mechanism of protection of their borders (Wasem 2004). Protection was not the only advantage
of having a visa system. In terms of restrictions, the requirement of visa issuance lessened the
burden and the expenses of the state and federal governments. Instead of applying selective tests
in ports of entry, the tests could, at least partially, be applied in Consular posts abroad (Edwards
2001, 5). In other words, the first selective check could be taken miles and miles away from the
country, and another selective test could still be run when the immigrant would be de facto
crossing territorial lines. It seems very obvious that before the establishment of a visa system, the
United States was not very much concerned about quantitative restrictions, but the country was
already concerned about not having the “undesirable” accepted into American territories.
Under federal command, state or federal immigration officials were expected to deny a visa
or deport any person who could be at the margin of society. During many decades of the 1900’s,
pregnancy, civil status, and ethnicity could prevent an alien from proving his or her “good
character” to immigration officers. Circumstances like these were also excuses to judge aliens as
not capable of assimilation in America. Therefore, these aliens could easily be considered under
the conditions of becoming public charges. Eventually, the LPCC became what it is today, an
open legal provision, perhaps, a clause to be used according to special circumstances of certain
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times, more specifically, a clause that is used to follow economic patterns and to broaden the
limits of bureaucratic power in the battle against terrorism.
Although the literature and government records specifically related to the evolution of
immigration policy restriction clauses such as the LPCC, in the first half of the twentieth century,
are scarce, historical reviews such as Tichenor (2002), Edwards (2001), Daniels (2004), and
Richmond (1994) demonstrate that the use of exclusionary tools dates since the first day of the
Union. However, contemporary investigations of the usage of the LPCC as an important tool to
deny entrance to immigrants and non-immigrants applicants are rare. However, before such an
analysis can begin, it is necessary to point out the differences that seem to exist between the
selective instruments of the past and the system we have today.
First, the necessity to populate the U.S. and constantly stimulate foreigners to come to
America no longer exists. Second, the responsibilities acquired by immigration officers in the
new immigration organization and the refined bureaucratic system considerably augments the
guidelines for using the LPCC while it speeds the application process. Third, although the
section 212 of the INA experienced important changes in 1990, the LPCC remained unchanged.
Different practical applications are present (i.e. the number of deportations based on the LPC
clause declined to near zero, but the numbers of visa rejections continued very significant)
(Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2002 and Report of the Visa Office 1966-2002). 11 In any
case, since the establishment of a strong American consular system abroad, the LPCC has been
regularly used. 12

11

Visa ineligibilities are separated into subject matter. Also, Appendix 1 corresponds to a table with the “subjective causes
for ineligibility” (section 212(a)) and “objective causes” like the 3 last subsections listed in the same table. This research
does not consider the objective causes for its theoretical purposes or for its quantitative analysis.
12
This statement is true if one considers only the subjective grounds for ineligibilities such as Sections 212 1, 2, 3, and 4
of the INA. It is clear that material errors in the application process are the main reason for a visa rejection (INA, Sections

25

After the 1990 Immigration Act, the LPCC was temporarily forgotten by legislators and
immigration specialists; other grounds for exclusion became more notorious, such as clauses that
were based on public health, political, and specific labor-related concerns. 13 In 1996 when
Californian immigrants reported enormous fear of being deported on the basis of the LPCC, the
LPC doctrine, which was dormant for decades, was again the subject of investigation and the
center of the legislative and administrative welfare/immigration debate. This special attention
was due to the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Immigration Responsibility Act
(PRWORA, 1996) combined with the Illegal Immigration and Immigration Responsibility Act
(IRIRA) of the same year. Both Acts created new rules for legal immigrants to take advantage of
certain federal benefits.
According to the PRWORA, the part of the eligible population in legal permanent residence
status that had not applied (except for the disabled) or that had arrived in the country after
August 1996 was no longer eligible for the supplemental income program (PRWORA, 1996).
This rule came along with the misleading idea that all immigrants who were on welfare would be
subject to the LPC test and possibly subject to deportation. As a result, in the mid and late
1990’s a different preoccupation connected to the LPC test arose: this antecedent became better
known as a legitimate ground for deportation.
Immigrants were not the only ones who had reason to fear the new PRWORA and the LPC
deportation threat. Applicants for permanent residence status were also covered by new
PRWORA regulations. Besides, the 1996 IRIRA brought the requirement of a legally binding
affidavit of support. Before 1996, the affidavit was not legally binding and neither the state nor
214 b, 221g.) However, material errors are not connected to individual attributes, which is a key-issue for this study. For a
complete list on the current grounds of ineligibility, see Appendix 1.
13
Although the usage of exclusionary clauses based on Security-related grounds (212(a) (3) and those related to Labor
Certification 212(a) (5) have never been as significant as the levels of LPCC usage specially before the year 2000, they
were major concerns of both restrictionists and libertarians during the immigration debate of the mid 1990’s and during
the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform.
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the federal government had legitimacy to recover social benefits from an immigrant or citizen
sponsor, in case the sponsored immigrant received means tested benefits. These precautions
seem to have different goals if analyzed in terms of pre or post-entry LPC doctrine. In the first
case, the threat of recognizing public charges among immigrants who receive cash benefits from
the government (a requirement that was clarified by the 1999 Federal Regulation 64, FR 2867628688) works like a warning, like an alert element not only for legal but also for illegal
immigrants who have been taking advantage of some state welfare programs. In terms of the preentry LPC doctrine, it is quite clear that there are indicators to assume that the LPCC has been
used either to qualitatively select immigrants, or at least, to decrease the number of aliens
granted a visa in a given year.
When one interprets the legislative mandates of 1990, the 1996 PRWORA, the 1996 IRIRA,
and the regulatory clarification of 1999, it is possible to notice a change in perspective when
compared to the legislation of 1986. Since 1990, legislators have inserted into the law a more
qualitative approach with the systematization of a job-related visa preference and financial
requirements. Besides, the 1999 regulation also inserts a qualitative approach directly into the
LPCC. Although total immigration numbers are still rising, a fact that is consistent with the
historical traditions of this country, a more stringent process of visa selection may be the answer
to the hectic routine of the American posts abroad, which receive hundreds of new applications a
day. But, again, how important is the overload fact since Congress has not recently discussed the
INA restriction clauses and their strict applicability?
The strict legal interpretation of “public charge”, which includes those aliens who have more
probability of becoming financially dependent on public assistance, does not completely explain
the circumstances around the large utilization of the LPCC by American posts abroad. First of
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all, until 1999 similar LPC clauses had been used for almost two centuries and its single meaning
and usages had never been officially clarified. Because of the furor caused by the PRWORA, the
Clinton administration published a regulation (INS 1999) explaining the meaning of the public
charge clause and the circumstances for its use. However, the regulation was more an
explanation of the PRWORA than a clarification of the applicability of the LPCC. In any case,
the 1999 regulation was relevant especially in respect to the operation of the post-entry LPCC. It
determined that only immigrants who have been receiving cash assistance in their first five years
of presence in America would be subject to the deportation test (INS 1999).
According to Edwards (2001), the current numbers on deportations caused by the
applicability of the LPCC are almost insignificant. It could not be any different, considering that
federal cash assistance is no longer part of the pool of benefits that new immigrants are eligible
for (after 1996), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a means tested federal
program administered by the states, is likewise not available for the permanent residents for the
first five years of residence. 14 Therefore, if one reads the welfare reform of 1996 and the 1999
regulation combined, the post- entry LPC test, based on abuse of the public safety net by
permanent residents, as it was presented in 1996, becomes inoperant.
The pre-entry LPC doctrine, however, has been studied less and used more than the postentry doctrine, which was the main subject of the regulatory clarification issued in 1999.
Different from the post-entry LPC test, the pre-entry LPC test applies for immigrants and nonimmigrants when they go through the visa process. In the modern organization of the
immigration system, asylees and refugees are granted a hybrid immigration status, which permits
a faster transition to permanent residence after one year in American territory. Consequently,

14

Refugees and asylees are exempt from the PRWORA limitation. Nonetheless, this fact does not interfere with the
understanding of an ineffectual regulation, since the humanitarian entries are not subject to the LPC test.
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they are not subject to the LPC test, due to the fact that asylees and refugees are part of a smaller,
but not less important, category of immigrants who enter the country under humanitarian
reasons.
The LPCC, then, gains a lot more significance when it is considered an important component
of the visa issuance process than a legitimate reason for deportation. Generally, the LPC test preentry occurs in the American consulates abroad. The LPC test is the first mechanism to
determine eligibility. In order to pass this selective test, nonimmigrant visa applicants, usually,
have the duty to prove that they have enough funds in their home countries to financially support
themselves while in America. Most immigrant visa applicants have the duty to provide the
immigration officer with the Affidavit of Support (mentioned above), and/or robust information
about his/her solid financial condition (INS 1999). In any case, even if applicants for temporary
or permanent visas furnish the immigration officer with all documentation needed, they may fail
the LPC test (U.S. DOS 2002). This conclusion indicates that the LPCC might be either a
mechanism to keep visa issuance numbers within the ceiling determined by the 1990 Act, or a
more complex tool for qualitative scrutiny.
Legislators and immigration officers pay a lot of attention to quantitative limits, while the
impact of qualitative restrictions is being ignored (Suro 1996, 16). In addition to the concerns to
stimulate high- qualified workers and to preserve traditions of family reunification, few
discussions have taken place about the necessity to establish a more qualitative system (also
called multi-point system). Americans still rely on the vagueness of the Section 212 of the INA
to define a trace of qualitative selection within the visa process. The U.S. continues to use a
negative approach (refusing visas on the basis of what the country determines ineligible).
However, nations like New Zealand adopt a more positive line, which rewards individual
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attributes (Immigration New Zealand 2005). Perhaps the mistreatment of qualitative restrictions
is the key for the failure of American immigration policy. If qualitative preferences were clearly
established by law and regulations, the American immigration policy would have results that are
closer to its original goals. If this is true, then the studies of institutional restrictions become
critical, especially for the purposes of defining which characteristics have continuously been
rejected by immigration officers, and which characteristics should be preferred in America today.
One could say the immigration system, after so many debates, studies, and congressional
commissions, should be a lot different and a lot fairer than it was 184 years ago. Nonetheless, in
terms of restrictions, the major similarity of both systems remains the great amount of discretion
that an immigration officer is given to decide who gets a visa and who does not. In times when
so many visa applications are being filled, what are the criteria that determine who should be
chosen? It is not clear what the decisive criteria are in the immigration legislation and
regulations. Nonetheless, if it is true that the visa process has to be strengthened to meet the
demand of the War on Terror, as suggested by the Government Accountability Office (GAO
2002), should it be on the basis of bureaucratic empowerment or should it be on the basis of
legislative action?
Since America extended Consular powers to control immigrant flows, the amount and the
appropriateness of consular officers’ decisions have been questioned. “Critics soon charged that
the Consular and Visa Bureaus had established arbitrary and labyrinthine rules that demonstrated
unmistakable prejudice against Jewish immigrants. ... The powers of the Chief of the Visa Office
are almost unlimited and appeal against his decision is practically impossible” (Reuben Fink, as
cited by Tichenor 2002, 155). Although certain administrative decisions are now subject to
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revision through the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 15 the vast majority of visa issuance
cases end with the final word of the Consular officers (USCIS 2004, Making Immigration Law).
If consular officials had a great amount of discretionary power in the past, since 2002, they have
been called counter-terrorism actors and are expected to exercise even greater control of
immigration flows in their posts abroad (GAO, 2002, p.18).
The importance of terrorist attacks in September 11 of 2001 established an emergency tone
within all American government agencies. The extreme measures taken against aliens applying
for temporary visas and aliens already in the U.S. after that event indicate that the immigration
system was also affected. Whether officers will intensify their use of discretionary power in the
immigration processes is a key-question to the understanding of the visa issuance process. A
simple investigation into the decreased numbers of total visas issued after September 11 may not
tell us much, especially in terms of non-immigrant visas, due to the inclusion of the visa for
pleasure under this category. However, one simple and meaningful mechanism to look for
positive signs of this correlational relationship (terrorism against the U.S. and visa
restrictionism), and all others suggested by this study, is to observe the use of the LPCC.
The pure investigation of the law and immigration regulations, as they are today, does not
help society to completely understand the visa rejections on the grounds of the LPCC. Although
immigration scholars advocate a more comprehensive legal reform, old selection mechanisms
remain almost exclusively administrative. In order to comprehend what lies behind the legal
reasons to grant or deny visa requests, which represents a strong expectation to enter America, 16

15

The BIA has jurisdiction in most matters related to removal issues. However, in terms of immigrant applications, the
BIA has partial jurisdiction over few of the categories established for preferential applicants. (USCIS 2004, Immigration
Laws, Regulations, and Guides)
16

We refer here to the American visa as a document granting mere expectation of entry rather than right to entry.
Immigration officers may not authorize an alien to enter the country, even if this alien provides appropriate consular
documentation. This practice is commonly adopted worldwide for security purposes. Although these occurrences are
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it is necessary to correlate the use of the LPCC with social, economic and national security
circumstances. The adequacy and the relevance of these relationships are empirically assessed in
the next chapter.

not frequent, they happen sporadically. Beyond that, the confusion between a visa and the right to enter in America
causes interpretation problems that should be avoided. However, for the purposes of the LPC phenomenon, as
explained in the first chapter, this differentiation is not so relevant, since the LPC test happens in the posts abroad as
a component of the visa issuance process.
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The use of the LPCC is a measure of how different factors, like economic and national
security situations, impact immigration targets. Therefore, the relationship between the current
American immigration policy and de facto patterns of restriction are observed through the LPCC.
Simple observation of the data suggests there are some external factors driving the rejection of
visas, through the LPC device, especially when it comes to nonimmigrant visas. Given that the
visa selection process is a hotly debated topic since September 11, 2001, an effort to define
possible predictors, which drive a larger utilization of the LPC clause, becomes critical to
understanding the real demands of a future reform in the American visa issuance system.
The definition of predictors behind the LPCC usage is not obvious. It is possible, through the
analysis of immigration history, to anticipate the explanatory variables that are more likely to
support the theory presented in the first two chapters. According to the literature review and the
legal investigation provided, the LPC doctrine has often been connected with the necessity to
lessen labor competition, 17 and to enhance levels of national security. 18 Secondary elements
would be related to the politics of welfare abuse carried with the 1996 PRWORA, legislative and
regulatory changes, and, finally, to the necessity of limiting immigration numbers. 19 In order to
empirically address these issues, I first discuss this study’s variables, methodology, and results. 20

17

The assumption that immigrants displace natives from their jobs is highly questioned in the scholarship. For more
information on immigration’s impact on the labor market, see Borjas (1999) .
18
This assumption is also very controversial, and although many immigrants take advantage of welfare programs, state
programs have absorbed most of immigrants in welfare rolls since the 1996 reform. See Borjas (1999).
19

The issue of racial bias within the visa issuance process could not be assessed by this study, because of data
limitations in the time frame (1966-2002) of the analysis. Unfortunately, data broken down by race, such as
unemployment rate or poverty levels, started to be collected only in the early 1970’s.
20
There are many obstacles in the data preparation and data analysis processes, especially those inherited from the
Visa Office data reporting system. The difficulties with the data are related to the peculiarities between the
population of immigrant and non-immigrant visas, the difficult access to (or unavailability of) old issues of the
Report of the Visa Office (the 1982 report was not found,) the confusing layout of the tables presented with the
LPCC numbers, the inclusion of visa applications denied or accepted from prior years, and the inconsistency with
the reporting of the data over the years.
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The data collected for the two dependent variables, LPCC use to reject immigrant visas and
LPCC use to reject nonimmigrant visas, are derived from the Report of the Visa Office (19662002). 21 The data provided include the number of applicants that first had fallen into the
category of refused under the LPCC and also the applicants who had overcome the initial refusal.
Properly, this nomination changed to “ineligibility” and “ineligibility overcome” in the 1990’s.
The problem that arises here is that the same applicant who had his or her visa denied at first
might not overcome the ineligibility in the same year and, therefore, be granted a visa in the
following year (United States Department of State 1970). Although this problem is clear, this
paper follows the recommendations and the percentage calculations of the Congressional
Research Service to establish the actual number of visa denied and the percentages of the use of
the LPCC (Wasem 2004, 10). According to Wasem’s analysis, the numbers offered by the Visa
Office for “ineligibility overcome” can be simply subtracted from the number of “primary
ineligibilities” under the same section, for the same year, in order to represent the number of total
ineligibilities found in a given category, in this case, the LPCC.
Wasem’s report (2004) also shows that, in order to obtain the percentages on the use of the
LPCC, it is important to deduct the number of ineligibilities that occurred based on objective
grounds such as the failure to establish eligibility for certain visa status (applicable to nonimmigrants only) or the lack of documentation. Since material errors are the major causes for
visa denials, with numbers a lot larger than those achieved by subjective clauses, if the

21

Unfortunately, the data correspondent to the first years subjected to this analysis, were not presented in the same way as
it has been presented since the 1970’s. In the Visa Reports of 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969 it is not possible to distinguish
which visas were actually denied and which visas only had their processing stopped for a period of time and, then, granted.
To overcome this problem, the solution was to utilize the estimations of the Visa Office to account for the percentages of
visas that were actually denied at those given years under the LPC clause.
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percentages of LPCC in relation to total denials would be measured with the number of objective
denials included, its power would be definitely underestimated.
From 1966 till 2002, the use of the LPCC varies considerably from one decade to another. In
addition, the numbers vary significantly between the two usages of the LPCC pre-entry: to deny
immigrant visas and to deny nonimmigrant visas. The association between the former and the
latter with the total numbers of aliens accepted into the respective category is also discrepant.
While the LPCC use to deny immigrants can reach more than 50% (as it happened in 1989), the
same is not true in relation to the LPCC usage to reject nonimmigrants: the numbers are very
small when inserted into the pool of total aliens who enter the country under temporary visas. 22
Another factor that has to be addressed in terms of the dependent variables is the difference
between the total number of immigrants admitted and the number of immigrant visas issued
abroad. The total number of immigrants accepted in a fiscal year, according to the Homeland
Security statistics, includes all aliens who receive permanent resident status. This includes all
aliens who received a visa abroad and also all aliens who received the same status through some
type of humanitarian cause opening or adjustment of status. Therefore, the total number this
analysis takes under consideration is only the number related to applications abroad, which is a
lot smaller than the numbers presented for total immigration by the media and by historical
reviews. The same concern happens towards nonimmigrant numbers in the sense that the number
of nonimmigrant visas is much smaller than the number of nonimmigrants that enter the country
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One of the reasons why the difference between the total number of nonimmigrant visas issued and the LPCC rejection
number is enormous is that temporary visas include tourist visas (technically called “for pleasure”). In order to have a clear
relationship between the aliens accepted and the number of LPCC denials, within the nonimmigrant category, the most
representative measurement would not involve the issuance of visas for pleasure. It is reasonable to assume that these
applicants are not subject to the LPC test. However, there are no data available divided by visa categories in terms of the
restriction clauses. Therefore, the only recourse I have is to use the inclusive number, but attempt to not underestimate the
clause, because of the presence of hundred thousands of tourists admitted within the number of total nonimmigrant visa
issued.
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in one fiscal year, given that many of the nonimmigrants enter the country repeatedly or with
visas granted for a previous entrance.
Having explained the process of data collection in terms of the dependent variables, I present
the explanatory variables and the measuring mechanisms used to test the correlation validity
between the expansion in the LPCC usage to deny nonimmigrant visas, from 1966 to 2002,
unemployment rate, employment available in thousands (1966-2002), major terrorist attacks
against U.S. targets, legislative and regulatory changes, and total number of nonimmigrants visas
issued (1966-2002). As a result, the hypothesis that the LPCC clause is more likely to be used in
periods with economic and national security difficulties is tested with the following Equation (1):

Y = U+E+T+L+V
(1)

where Y represents the number of nonimmigrant visas denied on the basis of the LPCC, U is the
unemployment rate, E is the employment available in thousands, T is the presence of a major
terrorist attack against the U.S., L represents major legal and regulatory changes related to the
LPC, and V is the number of visas issued.
The proposed correlation between immigrant visa denials on the basis of the LPCC controls
for unemployment rate (1966-2002), employment available in thousands (1966-2002), major
terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, legislative and regulatory changes, number of total
immigrants visas issued (1966-2002), and presence of new regulations imposed by the 1996
welfare reform. In this case, the model follows the Equation (2):
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Y² = U+E+T+L+V+W
(2)

where Y² represents the number of immigrant visas denied on the bases of the LPCC, and W
represents the legislative enactment and effect of the PRWORA (1996). All other alphabetic
symbols represent the same variables in the first equation.
The categorical variables, occurrence of major terrorist attacks in a given year against the
United States, main legislative and regulatory changes that affected restriction clauses within the
INA, and the enactment and effect of the PRWORA were treated as discrete categorical
variables, through the assignment of dummy variables. Both the welfare and the terrorist-related
variables received the number (0) or (1) to respectively indicate either absence or presence in a
given year. Years counting with major terrorist attacks are defined based on the chronology
provided by Quillen (2002), and using resources provided by the CIA Report (2005) and
Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Flemming (ITERATE 2004) to specifically define attacks that
targeted the U.S. According to Quillen (2002, 280) mass casualties 23 attacks are those with a
minimum casualty rate of 25 deaths. Since the CIA Report (2005) recognizes 1978 and 1979 as
the years in which America has been considered as one of the main targets of International
Terrorism, 1978 was the first year to be assigned the number (1). 24 Despite the fact that authors
like Daniel S. Masters have a broader approach to the definition of mass casualties, including
number of wounded and dead subjects into the calculation of total casualties, for the purpose of
this study, Quillen’s cutoff number (25 people dead) was adopted (Masters 2006). The choice of
23

Although the author mentions that the most appropriate label for this criterion would be “mass fatality”, since he
deals with the number of people dead, he adopts the term casualties throughout his work, terminology that is kept by
this study (Quillen 2002, 281)
24
A list with the years and the respective terrorist events considered for the regression are listed in Appendix B. As
mentioned early in this chapter, to every year included in such list, I assigned the number (1) (i.e. presence of major
terrorist attack).
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fatality rate (instead of total causality) helps to prevent and overestimation of the security
variable.
The security variable is critical to establish the impact of terrorist attacks against the U.S. on
the process of visa issuance. In this case, I was looking for signs of LPCC use peaks during
periods of security-threat, since most terrorists who have tragically attacked the U.S. in recent
years are foreigners. Many of the terrorists, when attacking domestically, were holding
temporary visas. It is common knowledge that the visa processes have been strengthened since
September 11, and that the rate of applications dropped right after the same event. Most of these
restrictions were part of legislative and regulatory package included in the War on Terror.
The legislative-regulatory variable also received dummies, but they were treated differently,
in order to comply with the regression technique adopted. This variable represents legislative or
regulatory increments related to the restriction clauses in general, or to the LPCC, in particular.
The period under the original legislative text (1965-1989), when the “Grounds for Refusal
Section” was included in the INA, is assigned the binomial combination (0, 0). In 1990, the
major immigration reform occurred and the “grounds for refusal” became “grounds for
ineligibility.” In the 1990’s, new social concerns were inserted in the Immigration Act, such as
the preoccupation with epidemic diseases. To this stage, the numbers (0, 1) are assigned. In
1999, the INS proposed an administrative regulation, which defined circumstances of LPC
usage. This period received the numbers (1, 0). Finally, in 2001, legislation and regulations
inherent to the War against Terror broadened the grounds of ineligibilities based on securityrelated factors and broadened the role of immigration officers, who were now considered
counter-terrorism agents. This phase received the binomial combination (1, 1). Each number of
the binomial combinations above was treated as a separate variable. Nonetheless, the results
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were interpreted taking under consideration the effect of both numbers assigned to each binomial
combination in relation to the use of the LPCC.
The welfare reform variable is measured solely against the dependent variable of LPCC use
to refuse the granting of an immigrant visa. Temporary visa holders are not eligible for any
federal welfare programs; on the other hand, permanent residents were eligible for many of the
federal programs before the 1996 welfare reform and remain eligible for some of these programs,
but only after five years of permanent residence status. Even though the welfare reform variable
was not considered a major predictor, because of the extensive literature on the impact of the
PRWORA and the 1999 INS LPC regulation, it was included in the regression. Specifically, I
attempt to control for the fact that the PRWORA inserted a type of mobilization to prevent
immigrants from becoming public charges that could stimulate bureaucracies to strengthen the
LPC scrutiny. The period without welfare reform (from 1966 to 1996) receives the dummy
variable (0), while the period from 1997 to 2002 is assigned the number (1).
The explanatory variables related to economics are unemployment rate, and the amount of
employment available in thousands, both provided by the Foreign Labor Statistics on-line
databases. The first variable was chosen because of its historical connection with the LPCC use
during employment shortages (Edwards 2001). As most of the nonimmigrant populations have
legal employment restrictions, the relationship between the economic variables and LPCC usage
is cited by scholars to be more connected to the population of immigrants than nonimmigrants.
The question that arises is whether a high unemployment rate causes every immigrant to
have a greater chance to become a public charge or if a high unemployment rate causes
immigration officers to deny immigrants for the purposes of labor competition control; the two
reasons, the likelihood of becoming a public charge, and the likelihood of being more labor
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competitive, overlap. Therefore, the solution was to correlate a variable that offers the amount of
employment available with the usage of the LPCC. Since the Foreign Labor Statistics glossary
explains that the amount of employment available is measured through the number of jobs
available on the last commercial day of a given period, these numbers reduce the problem of
having a general predisposition to every job seeker, immigrant or not, to increase his or her
chances of becoming a public charge. 25 The goal here is to determine whether the chance of
becoming a public charge is increasing for everybody in a time of crisis, or if it suggests that
crisis affects the foreign labor force on a larger scale.
Finally, the last variable used, the number of total visas issued, relies on the idea that we
must establish an assessment to know how many of the rejections are due to factors other than
the natural growth of the number of visas being issued. The source of this variable is also the
Report of the Visa Office for the years of 1966 to 2002. Although, at first sight, this variable
seems to incorporate a serious problem of multicollinearity, this actually does not happen. When
the calculus for the use of the LPCC was conducted, only the number of visas that were in fact
denied was accounted for.
While the data for the explanatory variables were easily collected and prepared, to provide an
initial test for our hypotheses, the data on the use of LPCC underwent a Logistic Transformation. 26

This technique was necessary given the longitudinal nature of the data and the fact that the data
were presented in percentages. After using the logistic function, probabilities may take any real
value in a linear relationship with the explanatory variables. The Logistic function is represented
by
25

When one analyzes the numbers provided by the Foreign Labor Statistics (2005) for employment available it is
easy to notice that these numbers keep a steady growth. However, the unemployment rate fluctuates in reasonably
visible frequency over time.
26
For more information on Logistic Transformation see the work of Scott M. Lynch (2003).
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Υ = NLog ( P / 1 − P)

where Y is the dependent variable and p is the percentage value of the LPCC each year. Nlog
represents the natural log, or the inverse of the exponential function for the LPCC percentage.
This transformation enables the data to overcome the assumption that the predicted value for
LPCC would fall between 0 and 1. After the logistic preparation of the data, OLS Regression
analysis was performed. For the population of LPC ineligibilities concerning immigrant
applicants, descriptive time-series techniques were also used.
After the first regression, the results indicated that some of the predictors were not
statistically significant. In fact, at this point, I found no support for the hypothesis represented by
Equation 2, which refers to the immigrant applicant population and the use of the LPCC.
However, I found significant predictors for the use of LPCC to reject nonimmigrant visas,
although there were some clear differences across the explanatory variables. For this reason, I
conducted two other regressions, including only significant predictors. The final test included
only the two significant variables remaining, terrorism, and employment available. The final
equation (called Equation 3) is the result of OLS Regression Analysis of the data for the nonimmigrant applicant population, after conducting two regressions and variable sifting exercises.
Equation 3 represents the relationship between the LPCC (nonimmigrant applicants) and the two
variables that remained significant throughout the analysis process. These explanatory variables
are terrorism and employment available. The variable, number of total visas issued, was
significant at first, but when included in the regression with the most significant predictors only,
its relationship with the response variables was very weak.
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As a result, the final model is presented by Equation 3, represented below:

Υ' = T + E
(3)

where Y’ represents the usage of LPCC for nonimmigrant applicants; E represents employment
available; T stands for the categorical variable of terrorism. Table 2 brings the summary
statistics, from which the model was derived. The results for the tests conducted for Equations 1,
2, and 3 are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. OLS Regression: Results for Equations 1, 2, and 3
Dependent
Variables
Independent
Variables

LPCC Nonimmigrant
Equation 1/Y
Coeff.

Intercept

LPCC Immigrant
Equation/Y²

(SE)

Coeff.

LPCC Nonimmigrant
Equation 3/Y'

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

-3.191

1.076

1.145

2.530

-2.99

2.801

0.198

0.127

0.273

0.238

-7.6E-05*

3.35E-05

1.59E-05

4.48E-05

1.25E-05

1.04E-05

Terrorism

0.861*

0.394

0.030

0.843

0.980*

0.452

Legislation

0.721

1.079

1.040

1.878

Legislation

2.269

0.836

1.794

2.047

0.047

1.264

Unemployment
Rate
Employment

Visas
N=
R-Squared

6.37E-07**

2.3E-07

35

36

35

0.18

0.13

0.29

Note. * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01
Note. E = the number of decimal cases to the left.
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Through the analysis of this final regression, terrorism is significant at the .038 level. It also
has a strong coefficient. Nonetheless, because of two main factors, the analysis of these results
cannot be interpreted only by the summary output of the regression. The terrorism variable was
treated as discrete and categorical. The independent variable is being measured using its natural
log. Therefore, the analysis requires that we understand what the predictor really means to the
LPCC phenomenon in relation to both situations represented by the variable, either presence or
absence of a major terrorist attack against the U.S.
If we use the exponential function to reinterpret the data for the independent variable (since
the natural log is the inverse of the exponential function), and if we assume that all other factors
involved on the regression process (employment) remain equal, it is possible to see a very
important influence of the presence of a terrorist attack upon the LPCC phenomenon.
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Table 3. Effect of Terrorism (Absence or Presence) on the LPCC Phenomenon
Slope
Intercept

0.0000125

0.0000125

-3.19

-2.21

Predicted Probability of LPCC
Employment
Without Terrorist Attack

Available

With Terrorist Attack

0

0.041171871

0.109700649

10000

0.046653842

0.12430712

20000

0.052865729

0.140858421

30000

0.059904719

0.159613502

40000

0.067880939

0.180865793

50000

0.076919181

0.204947793

60000

0.087160851

0.232236275

70000

0.098766184

0.263158175

80000

0.111916749

0.298197279

90000

0.126818291

0.337901786

100000

0.14370395

0.382892886

110000

0.162837908

0.433874481

120000

0.184519524

0.491644197

130000

0.209088013

0.557105862

140000

0.236927759

0.631283646

The graphical representation of Table 3 is more meaningful.
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Figure 1. Effect of Terrorism (Presence or Absence) on the LPCC
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Whether the LPCC was used more after September 11, specifically, is a question that can not
be adequately addressed in this study, since we count with official data of the Visa Office for the
LPCC numbers up to the year of 2002. Data available for 2003, 2004, and 2005 are only
preliminary and for this reason were not included in this study. Even with little variation for the
years following September 11 of 2001, the correlation between major terrorist attacks against the
U.S. and the LPCC usage for the population of non-immigrants was significant at the 0.037 level
in the first regression and 0.038 level in the final regression.
While the terrorist predictor allows us to reject the null hypothesis and visualize a use of the
LPCC other than the one established by law, the predictors for the immigrant applicant
population failed to establish both linearity and nonlinearity in relation to the LPC phenomenon.
After testing for the normality of the immigrant applicant sample, I decided to look for
comparable frequencies between the LPCC and each predictor separately. Patterns of co-variance
over time were assessed descriptively. During this exercise, a pattern of co-variance was found
between the usage of LPCC for the immigrant applicants and unemployment rate, and, also, a
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relationship between the use of the LPC clause and the 1990 Immigration Act. The frequencies
for unemployment rate and the use of LPCC (immigrant applicant sample) are represented by
Figure 2.
Figure 2. LPCC Immigrant and Unemployment Rate: Frequencies Over time

LPCC (immigrant) and Unemployment Rate Frequencies
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-10

r =0.35

The simple exercise of plotting the data for LPCC usage and unemployment rate from 1966
till 2002 27 shows that the two factors covary over time, especially before the 1990 legislation.
From 1965 till 1990 it is possible to see the co-variation, although counting with a significant lag
in time. After 1990, the system of preferences of the INA was completely remodeled. The 1990
Immigration Act included some qualitative features in the text of the law and inaugurated a new
era of coexistence of policy guided by the theme of reunification and the necessity of stimulating
the importation of qualified workers. Perhaps this thematic coexistence has changed the pattern

27

Except for 1982, due to unavailability of data.
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of the LPCC usage in relation to the unemployment rate. After 1990, the different grounds for
ineligibility were established, such as the lack of labor certification and ineligibilities related to
unqualified health-care professions and to other sponsored workers, who now undertake a
differentiated procedure. All these legislative changes may have enabled immigration officers to
work more independently from other factors. For this, further research seems to be essential not
only to define the relevance of the LPCC, but of each ground of ineligibility listed under the
Section 212 of the INA.
Generalizing, these findings seem to shed light on the dynamics of the visa issuance process.
The regressions point out a very different interpretation of the LPCC behavior among the two
population groups: security concerns are significant predictors for LPCC usage to deny
nonimmigrant visas. The LPCC usage to refuse immigrant visas indicates that the

relationships between LPC clause applicability and its main predictors are neither linear nor nonlinearly correlated, but present a correlation over time (at least in relation to the sample) with
unemployment rate. The data support the generalization that external factors are driving the use
of the LPCC for the nonimmigrant applicant sample. In addition, the data suggest that the visa
issuance process (as established by law) is not consistent with the new demands derived from a
mobile workforce and extreme measures taken to secure the American homeland.
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FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper represents a starting point for a broader study of decisions to grant or deny U.S.
visas. The extenuated immigration bureaucratic empowerment may be evidence of
Congressional lethargy in response to rapid changes in society, in this case, to the transformation
of the American immigration profile and its implications. These days, facilitated communication
and mobility connect more people to the possibility (at many times, a dream) to come to America
than what America can take. Unfortunately, the demand for an American visa is so high that the
question of “how many” changes to “who” deserves a visa. As demonstrated above, American
immigration policy has few answers to this question. Qualitative requirements can be inferred
from the preference of having an American employer as a sponsor and the exclusionist categories
brought by the immigration restriction clauses, such as the LPCC.
The importance of this paper’s finding is more related to the nature of its relationships than to
the number of visas being denied. The fact that terrorism was the most significant variable to
define use of the LPCC for the nonimmigrant applicant population, and that unemployment rate
covary with the percentages of the LPCC use (in relation to the immigrant applicant sample)
from 1966 to 1990 is an indicator that the 1952 INA, and its 1990 amendment, approximated the
reality of the bureaucratic practice to the text of the policy in what concerns the economic
changes in the American workforce. However, the same does not happen with the reality brought
to stricter scrutiny at American posts abroad since the United States became a consolidated
terrorist target.
This study does reveal correlations between LPCC use and external factors. However, more
testing is needed. Time-series lagged models, for example, were not tested here for many
reasons, for instance, difficulty of accessing the data, lack of resources, and time constraints.
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Further research may look for significant interactions among predictors and interactions between
the LPCC and other restriction clauses, such as labor certification. In preliminary data released
by the Visa Office for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, it is possible to see that the relatively
large number of immigrant visas refused on the basis of the Labor Certification clause (an
applicant may be denied if he or she might compete with American workers in pre-defined
professional fields) start to confirm a tendency over time. Therefore, the study of the relationship
between the usage of the LPCC and the Labor Certification clause may contribute to a more
accurate conclusion in relation to the usage of the LPCC as a mechanism to control labor
competition.
The relationship between terrorism and the LPC doctrine is another topic that deserves a lot
more attention. As said, the regression conducted in this paper counts with data from 1966 to
2002. It includes very little information on the use of the LPCC after September 11. Especially
for the non-immigrant applicant population, the development of this relationship has to be
followed. It is really fortunate to have found such a strong predictor in the terrorism-related
variable for the nonimmigrant applicant population. After 2001, most of the academic attention
has fallen back into the discussion about Civil Liberties and Terrorism, a subject that involves a
lot more permanent residents than visa applicants. Therefore, the difficulties that terrorism has
caused to visa applicants are, at many times, forgotten.
This study indicates that both theoretically and empirically, the visa issuance process is
vulnerable to certain rapid economic and social changes in society. It is also possible to say that
the dynamics of the LPCC phenomenon is dictated by the interpretations of the immigration
officer. Further research, especially accessing qualitative data from immigrant and nonimmigrant applications, may also explore the relationships of the bureaucratic power with more

49

specific characteristics, such as race and gender, in relation to visa rejections on the basis of
LPCC.
Since the visa issuance process is the center of the immigration selection process, and the
proportions of its relevance rose enormously after September 11, it is necessary to think about
the American visa issuance process as a congressional matter, even if it is currently more
centered in the bureaucratic work. This attitude is crucial for both sides, the applicant and
American society. For the applicant, a visa process guided by a clear immigration policy assures
transparency and fairness. For the American society, clearer policy (especially in terms of
restrictions or rewards) may be the road to a more efficient immigration selection and a
facilitated immigrant assimilation/acceptance process in the future.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Provisions on Grounds for Ineligibility Conforming the 212 Section of the INA

Grounds for Visa Ineligibility
Health Related Grounds
Communicable grounds
Immigrant lacking required vaccinations
Physical or mental disorder and behavior that may cause a threat
Drug abuser or addict
Criminal related grounds
Crime involving moral turpitude
Controlled substance violators
Multiple Criminal convictions
Controlled substance traffickers
Relative of substance trafficker who obtained benefit from illicit
activity within past five years
Prostitution within 10 years
Procuring within 10 years
Unlawful commercialized vice
Certain aliens involved in serious criminal activity who have
acerted immunity from prosecution
Foreign government officials who have engaged in violations of
religious freedom
Significant trafficker in persons as listed in yearly report to
Congress by President
Relative of trafficker on President’s list who obtained financial
benefit from the activity within the past five years
Security-related Grounds
Espionage, sabotage, or technology transfer
Other unlawful activity
Activity to overthrow the U.S. government
Terrorist Activities
Entry would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy
consequences
Immigrant membership in totalitarian party
Participation in Nazi persecution
Participation in genocide
Association with terrorist organizations
Applicant may become a public charge
Labor certification and qualifications of certain immigrants
Labor certification
Unqualified physicians
Uncertified foreign health care workers
Illegal entrants, immigration violators and misrepresentation
Aliens present without admission or parole
Failure to attend removal proceedings
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Section of the INA
212 (a)(1)
(A)(i)
(A)(ii)
(A)(iii)
(A)(iv)
212 (a)(2)
(A)(i)(I)
(A)(i)(II)
(B)
(C)(i)
(C)(ii)
(D)(i)
(D)(ii)
(D)(iii)
(E)
(G)
(H)(i)
(H)(ii)
212(a)(3)
(A)(i)
(A)(ii)
(A)(iii)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)(i)
(E)(ii)
(F)
212(a)(4)
212(a)(5)
(A)
(B)
(C)
212(a)(6)
(A)
(B)

Misrepresentation/fraud
False claim to U.S. citizenship
Stowaways
Smugglers of aliens
Subject of civil penalty for document fraud
Student visa abusers
Documentation requirements
No entry documentation (applies to immigrants at port of entry
only)
Nonimmigrant not in possession of valid passport and
nonimmigrant visa or border-crossing card
Ineligible for citizenship
Ineligible for citizenship in general
Draft evaders
Aliens previously removed and unlawfully present
Aliens previously removed
Aliens unlawfully present
Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations
Miscellaneous
Practicing polygamists (applicable only to immigrants
Guardian accompanying helpless alien (applicable only at port of
entry)
International child abduction
Unlawful voters
Former citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid taxes
Foreign residence requirement for foreign exchange visitor
Presidential proclamation suspending the entry of any class of aliens
Failure to establish entitlement to nonimmigrant status
Applications do not comply with the INA or related regulations
Aliens in illegal status required to apply for new nonimmigrant visa
in country of nationality
Source: Appendix III, GAO –03-132NI Visa Process Should be Strengthened, 2001.
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(C)(i)
(C)(ii)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
212(a)(7)
(A)
(B)
212(a)(8)
(A)
(B)
212(a)(9)
(A)
(B)
(C)
212(a)(10)
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
212(e)
212(f)
214(b)
221(g)
222(g)

APPENDIX B
Selected Major Terrorist Attacks Against the U.S.

Sources: ITERATE Data Set (1968-2002), CIA International Terrorism Report (2005), and
Quillen’s (2002) “Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology”
1978/1979 – Series of political kidnappings and assassinations (Premier Aldo Moro, from
Italy, and American Ambassador Adolph Dubs.) Iran Hostage Crisis takes place. CIA reports the
year 1978 as the consolidation of America and Western Europe as main terrorism targets.
1983 – U.S. and French barracks, Beirut. Three Hundred people were killed. A powerful
bomb destroys the U.S. embassy in Beirut. 63 people were killed.
1986 - TWA Flight 840.
1988 –Pam Am Flight 103 in Scotland with more than two hundred and fifty people killed.
1989 – UTA Flight 772 from Brazzaville to Paris. All one hundred and seventy people in the
plane were killed.
1993- 13 bombs exploded in Bombay. Targeted were Bombay Stock Exchange, and other
symbols of Westernized economic culture. 317 people died.
1995 – The largest terrorist attack in American soil up to this point, Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, killing one hundred and sixty six people, conducted the Oklahoma Federal
Building bombing. Hundreds of people were injured.
1996 – Attacks against U.S. increase in Colombia. Attack on Tel Aviv’s largest shopping
mall. Khobar Towers bombing outside U.S. Khobar military control base. Dozens of people were
killed and hundreds were injured.
1998 – U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa. More than 200 people were killed. Osama bin
Laden has been held responsible by the U.S.
2001 – World Trade Center and Pentagon incidents. Almost three thousand people were
killed.
2002 – Kuta Beach, Bali. Bombings to nightclubs often packed with tourists from U.S.,
Australia and Europe. Two hundred and two people were killed.
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